[1] Oral Presentation as Amicus Curiae submitted by retired Chief Justice ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN on September 16, 2026, at the invitation of, and to assist, the Senate of the Philippines in discharging its constitutional duty of trying and deciding the Impeachment Complaint filed by the House of Representatives against Vice President Sara Z. Duterte.
Your Honors, Senate President Sherwin Gatchalian, Presiding Officer Francis Escudero, and Senator-Judges. May it please the Honorable Senate in performing its constitutional duty and power to try and decide impeachment cases.
Thank you for inviting this humble retired chief justice as amicus curiae. Thank you too for allowing me to speak first to enable me to attend the Award Ceremony of the Foundation for Liberty and Prosperity, or FLP, this afternoon, where 20 exemplary law scholars will be granted P250,000 each, five MBA fellows will be granted P500,000 each, and five dissertation writing contest winners will be conferred more than P1.3 million in prizes. In fact, assisting me today are past recipients of these FLP awards: Atty. Arvin Cortez, Atty. Rachel Gella, and Mr. Jacob Barbosa.
With your indulgence, may I humbly request that I finish my presentation before taking questions. Since I will submit a copy of my written brief together with my column in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 17, 2026, titled “Two-thirds,” I will confine these remarks to four principal points.
Point one, as is generally known, an impeachment trial in the Senate is sui generis – Latin words that mean “of its own kind” or unique.[2] It is both legal and political.
Pursuant to its legal character, the honorable senators conduct the trial in accordance with the law on evidence and the Rules of Court. Witnesses are examined by eagle-eyed lawyers ready to overwhelm them. Our people see senators garbed in their majestic crimson robes and lawyers arguing as if they were in a judicial courtroom.
Politically, on the other hand, the composition is not confined to lawyers or jurists. Rather, its membership is open to elected political leaders who need not obtain formal legal education, need not pass the excruciating bar examination, and need not be scrutinized by the Judicial and Bar Council.
Your Honors are not sitting here as justices or lawyers. Truly, the Constitution does not require you to be lawyers or jurists. Neither are Your Honors expected to act like jurists. Notably, senators in the United States trying impeachment cases do not ape judges. They do not even wear judicial robes; instead, they are garbed in their normal attire.
Point two, the Constitution [Article XI, Section 3(6)[3]] states, “the Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation… No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”
How do judges and justices interpret the provisions of the Constitution (and the laws)? Answer: There are two major ways or methods of interpretation.
The first major method is verba legis: words are plainly read and given their ordinary meanings.[4] In such cases, there is “no need for interpretation but only application of the provision.” The Senate has 24 members; two-thirds of 24 is mathematically 16. Therefore, 16 votes are necessary to convict.
Indeed, mathematics is an exact science in the abstract. To repeat, in the abstract. Why? Because 2+ 2 is always 4 in the abstract; 3 + 3 is always 6; 2 x 10 is always 20. Therefore, 24 multiplied by two-thirds is always 16—in the abstract. But not always in reality.
For example, one small drop of water, when put together with another small drop of water, may become, in reality, one bigger drop of water. Reality sometimes changes the denominator in mathematics.
In the same way, constitutional interpretation cannot always stop at abstract mathematics. We must look at the intent and purpose of the constitutional provisions, the circumstances in which they operate, and the goals they seek to achieve.
Which brings us to the second way to interpret, the ratio legis est anima, or to quote the Supreme Court, “the reason of the law is the soul of the law.”[5] The text must be understood within its constitutional ambiance.[6]
To shorten my presentation, I will leave it to my more learned retired colleagues to present the jurisprudence on these two ways of interpretation. However, I have also included in the footnotes to my presentation the jurisprudence beginning with the 1924 case of Fuentes v. Director of Prisons[7] and the 1949 case of Avelino v. Cuenco[8] through to the 2026 case of Generillo v. Senate[9] – with which Your Honors must be familiar – since it also involved the present Senate and the present Vice President.
Relevantly, Your Honors may ask: Should the interpretation of the drafters of the Constitution prevail? With due respect, not necessarily. In our constitutional allocation and separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances, the makers of the law are not the final authorities on interpretation. That delicate task is lodged in an independent branch of government, the judiciary, and in the present case, the Honorable Senate.
Point Three, which of the two modes of interpretation should the Senate use in discharging its constitutional duty to try and decide impeachment cases? I respectfully submit that it is neither. Repeat. Neither of the two. Why? Because as I already said, senators are not jurists and lawyers. And they need not use the language or methods of magistrates. They are elected representatives-at-large of the entire electorate. They are the coequals of the justices of the Supreme Court.
So, how then should the Constitution be interpreted by the honorable senators? In my humble opinion, in accordance with their mandate as representatives of the people, specifically reflecting the common sense of the people, guided by two fundamental standards: truth and fairness.
The standard of truth is culled from the facts extracted (1) from studying and verifying the documents and papers submitted; and (2) from hearing the witnesses and observing their demeanor on the stand in front of you – the twitch of their eyes, their body language, the tone of their voices, and the spontaneity of their answers. By watching and listening to them face-to-face, Your Honors would know whether the witnesses are telling the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
Fairness, on the other hand, demands that we hear before we condemn and that all sides are given the opportunity to explain their language and actions. It is what lawyers call “due process,” and what ordinary people believe as fairness. As Themistocles once said, “Strike me as you may, but hear me first.”
Truly, I respectfully submit that active participation and independent evaluation of the evidence are essential to discharge the Senate’s and the senators’ constitutional responsibility.
Point four: Is a judgment of the Senate – based on truth and fairness – appealable to the Supreme Court? My respectful answer is a big No, because there is no constitutional provision allowing such an appeal. The Senate’s decision is final and unappealable. The only way by which the Court can review a Senate decision or order is when the Senate commits grave abuse of discretion. Repeat, not just ordinary abuse of discretion but grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion is not defined by the Constitution, but jurisprudence characterizes it as the “capricious [or] whimsical [or arbitrary] exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.”[10]
In simpler terms, the Court does not review the Senate’s judgment merely because it disagrees with it. Judicial review arises only when the Senate exercises its power in a capricious, whimsical or arbitrary manner, thereby going beyond the limits of its constitutional authority.
Thus, the Senate must hear the prosecution and the defense witnesses, as it already does, allow their counsels to argue verbally and in writing, and study their presentations deeply. Only thereafter should it issue its orders and decisions.
In this connection, is it truthful and fair to allow senators to cast their votes despite being absent from the proceedings? Should these senators be allowed to vote, though they are in hiding, abroad, legally detained, sick, hospitalized, or otherwise absent, and have not been able to access and examine the documents, have not heard the testimonies, and have not observed the demeanor of the witnesses?
To put it more picturesquely, is it truthful and fair to the parties, to our country, and to our people to allow those abroad – looking at the pyramids along the Nile, or shopping in the fashion houses of Paris, or riding the romantic gondolas of Venice, or deliberately hiding in the dark corners of the world while everyone here is sweating it out, listening to sometimes irrelevant and loquacious lawyers, and to humble and ancient amicus curiae like me?
To conclude, Your Honors are tasked with a constitutional duty that cannot be reduced to abstract arithmetic. Neither can such duty be performed in the shadows of absence. Nor from legal impediments. As the elected representatives of the Filipino people, Your Honors’ mandate demands a commonsensical interpretation of the Constitution. Indeed, meaningful adjudication requires active participation in the search for truth and fairness. I respectfully submit that only in this manner can Your Honors ensure a verdict that is fair to the parties, fair to Your Honors’ peers, and ultimately fair to our sovereign people.
Maraming salamat po muli sa inyong paanyaya at masusing pakikinig sa inyong abang lingkod.
[2] Duterte v. House of Representatives, 970 Phil. 65 (2025) [per SAJ Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, En Banc].
[3] Const., Art. XI, Sec. 3(6): The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (emphasis supplied)
[4] Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003) [per J Carpio Morales]; citing J.M Tuason v. LTA, 142 Phil. 393 (1970) [per J Fernando]; Osea v. Malaya, 425 Phil. 920 (2002). [per J Ynares-Santiago, En Banc] (applying the “plain meaning rule” or verba legis because the statutory language was clear, plain, and free from ambiguity); Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita,602 Phil. 342 (2009) [per J Carpio, En Banc] (applying the plain-meaning or verba legis rule in determining the statutory meaning of “higher education” under Republic Act No. 7722. The Supreme Court held that where statutory language is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation, and accordingly construed “higher education,” read together with the phrase “degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions,” to mean tertiary education leading to a degree. The Court thereby rejected an interpretation that would expand CHED’s statutory coverage to independent review centers); Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, 683 Phil. 198(2012). [per J Brion, En Banc] (holding that in construing constitutional provisions, the first rule is verba legis, under which, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution are given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Applying that rule to the constitutional reference to “local elections,” the Court gave “local” its ordinary meaning and held that elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao fell within its scope); Funa v. Villar, 686 Phil. 571(2012). [per J Velasco, Jr., En Banc] (applying verba legis in construing Article IX-D, Section 1(2) of the Constitution and holding that the primary source for ascertaining constitutional intent is the language of the provision itself, whose words should, where possible, be given their ordinary meaning. The Court further emphasized that courts “look to the language of the document itself” and, while they “do not of course stop there,” that is where constitutional interpretation begins); Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission, 705 Phil. 357(2013). [per J Brion, En Banc] (applying the plain-meaning rule or verba legis to the language of TIDCORP’s charter and construing the phrases “to endeavor” and “as closely as possible” in relation to the statute’s express exemption; holding that had Congress intended exact compliance with RA 6758, it would have so stated in unequivocal terms); Imbong v. Ochoa, 732 Phil. 1(2014). [per J Mendoza, En Banc] (applying the rule that constitutional words should be interpreted according to their plain and ordinary meaning in determining the meaning of “conception” under the Constitution, while also considering its medical meaning and the intent of the Framers); Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, 777 Phil. 280 (2016). [per CJ Sereno, En Banc] (holding that, in constitutional construction, the plain meaning of the language of the Constitution is of paramount consideration, and that constitutional words are generally given their ordinary meaning); Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, 791 Phil. 277 (2016). [per CJ Sereno, En Banc] (explaining on reconsideration that verba legis construes provisions according to their language as used, while recognizing that the Constitution must be interpreted so that its purposes may be effectively carried out); Ocampo v. Enriquez, 815 Phil. 1175(2017). [per J Peralta, En Banc] (applying verba legis to constitutional provisions invoked against the burial of former President Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani and holding that, because those provisions were simple, clear, and unequivocal, resort to extraneous aids such as Constitutional Commission deliberations was unnecessary; the Court emphasized that the constitutional text expresses the objective sought to be attained); Republic v. Manalo, 831 Phil. 33(2018). [per J Peralta, En Banc] (applying verba legis in construing Article 26 of the Family Code and refusing to insert a requirement that the alien spouse must have initiated the foreign divorce where the statutory text imposed no such condition; further explaining that even a strictly literal construction should not be followed where it would depart from legislative intent or produce inconvenience, absurdity, injustice, or a result inconsistent with the statute’s purpose); Mandanas v. Ochoa, 835 Phil. 97(2018). [per J Bersamin, En Banc] (applying verba legis non est recedendum to Section 6, Article X of the Constitution and holding that Congress could not restrict the constitutional phrase “national taxes” by limiting the statutory base for the LGUs’ just share to “national internal revenue taxes”; because the statutory phrase was more restrictive than the constitutional language, the Court held that Congress had impermissibly departed from the constitutional text); Cabigao v. Commission on Elections, 913 Phil. 960(2021). [per J Leonen, En Banc] (applying verba legis to Article VI, Sections 4 and 7 of the Constitution and rejecting the contention that reelection following a hiatus was prohibited merely because the Constitution did not expressly use the terms “hibernation,” “hiatus,” or “rest period.” The Court instead gave operative effect to the constitutional word “consecutive,” holding that it limits the prohibition to reelection for an immediately subsequent term and characterizing the contrary interpretation as an “extra-textual reading of the Constitution”); Bayan Muna Party-List Representatives v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 932 Phil. 753(2023). [per J Gaerlan, En Banc] (applying verba legis as the “first principle of constitutional construction” in determining the scope of “exploration” under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution. Giving the constitutional term its ordinary and technical meanings, the Court looked beyond the parties’ characterization of the undertaking as “pre-exploration” and held that an activity aimed at discovering petroleum constituted “exploration” within the constitutional provision).
[5] League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 623 Phil. 531 (2009) [per J Velasco Jr.,]; Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003) [per J Carpio Morales]; citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. 147 (1991).[Per. CJ. Fernan]; Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law 88–92, 101, 106 (Sari Bashi trans., Princeton University Press 2005); Comendador v. De Villa, 277 Phil. 93(1991). [per J Cruz, En Banc] (applying ratio legis est anima in determining the continued operation of a martial-law decree that had withdrawn the right to peremptory challenge before military tribunals. The Court held that because the decree had been adopted to implement the martial-law tribunal system, the termination of martial law and dismantling of that system caused the reason for the decree to cease; invoking the principle that “the reason of law is its soul,” the Court held that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge had consequently become ineffective); Lone Congressional District of Benguet Province v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., 923 Phil. 495(2022). [per J Inting, En Banc] (applying ratio legis est anima in construing the Special ADR Rules and holding that the absence of a mechanism for intervention must be understood according to the spirit and intent of the governing rules and statutes; emphasizing that “a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter,” and that interpretation should remain consistent with the objectives sought to be achieved by the legal regime); Quimvel v. People, 808 Phil. 889(2017). [per JVelasco, Jr., En Banc] (applying ratio legis est anima in construing Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 and rejecting additional requirements that would have placed certain forms of sexual abuse beyond the statute’s protection; emphasizing that “the reason of the law is the soul of the law” and that the statute would have failed in fulfilling its purpose of providing special protection to children from all forms of abuse under the contrary construction); League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 623 Phil. 531(2009). [per J Velasco, Jr., En Banc] (applying ratio legis est anima in resolving a constitutional challenge to the Cityhood Laws and holding that legislative intent is the controlling factor in statutory interpretation. The Court explained that a strictly literal construction may render a law meaningless or lead to inconvenience, absurdity, or injustice, and that courts should instead adopt the construction that best harmonizes with the context and most fully promotes the policy and objects of the law; thus, the spirit of the law may control its strict letter); Navarro v. Executive Secretary, 663 Phil. 546(2011). [per JNachura, En Banc] (applying ratio legis est anima in reconsidering the constitutionality of the law creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. Although the general provision of the Local Government Code did not expressly exempt island provinces from the minimum land-area requirement, the Court found that Congress, through the subsequent enactment creating Dinagat, had manifested its intent to incorporate such exemption into law; reiterating that what lies within legislative intent may be treated as within the statute although not expressly within its letter); La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 486 Phil. 754(2004). [per JPanganiban, En Banc] (applying ratio legis est anima in construing Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution after finding that a purely literal verba legis interpretation produced logical inconsistencies, incongruities, and ambiguities. The Court resorted to the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and held that the constitutional phrase “agreements involving either technical or financial assistance” encompassed service contracts with foreign corporations subject to constitutional safeguards, notwithstanding the omission of the term “service contracts” from the constitutional text; emphasizing that the framers necessarily assented to matters reasonably necessary to make the constitutional arrangement tenable and effective).
[6] Almeda v. Florentino, 122 Phil. 912(1965). [per JJB.L. Reyes] (applying ut res magis valeat quam pereat to reconcile apparently competing provisions of the Pasay City Charter and refusing to construe the later grant to the Vice-Mayor of authority to appoint “all the employees” of the Municipal Board as impliedly repealing the separate provision vesting appointment of the Board Secretary in the Board itself; emphasizing that courts are duty-bound, if reasonably possible, to adopt a construction that gives effect to every part of the law); Planters Association of Southern Negros, Inc. v. Ponferrada, 375 Phil. 901(1999). [per J Purisima] (applying ut magis valeat quam pereat to reconcile provisions of Republic Act No. 6982 that, when read separately, appeared to conflict; holding that each provision must be construed in connection with every other part of the law so as to produce a harmonious whole, and that apparently conflicting provisions should, if reasonably possible, be allowed to stand and given effect. Thus, the Court refused to construe Section 12’s apparently categorical substitution of existing benefits apart from Section 14’s prohibition against diminution of those benefits); Inding v. Sandiganbayan, 478 Phil. 506(2004). [per JCallejo, Sr., En Banc] (applying ut magis valeat quam pereat to reconcile provisions defining the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction and holding that statutory words and clauses should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions; rather, the whole and every part of the statute must be considered so as to produce a harmonious whole and, whenever reasonably possible, a construction should be adopted that gives effect to every part of the law); Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 616 Phil. 387(2009). [per JCorona, Special First Division] (applying ut magis valeat quam pereat and emphasizing that no word, clause, sentence, provision, or part of a statute should be rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or insignificant; thus preferring a construction that gives operative effect to every word of the law rather than one that leaves part of its text idle or nugatory).
[7] Andres Fuentes v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-22449 (1924). [per J Ostrand, En Banc] (construing a statutory requirement that a sentence of death penalty be signed by “all the members of the court” to mean only all members present for duty and actually constituting the court at the time the case is heard and decided, and holding that it does not mean every appointed justice, as a literal interpretation would lead to absurd and intolerable delays due to unavoidable absences, violating the accused’s constitutional right to a speedy trial)
[8] Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 (1949). [per Curiam, En Banc] (confronting whether twelve of twenty-four Senators sufficed to constitute a quorum and holding that the Senate’s effective membership for that purpose was twenty-three, because one Senator was outside the country and beyond the coercive processes the Senate could use to compel his attendance; twelve therefore constituted a majority of that effective membership)
[9] Generillo v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 278311 (2026). [per J Zamaleda, En Banc] (emphasizing that the Senate has the solemn constitutional duty to try and decide impeachment cases, and holding that under Article XI, Section 3(4) of the Constitution, “trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed” once a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all members of the House of Representatives, as the Constitution makes no distinction between the Senate and the Impeachment Court)
[10] Duterte v. House of Representatives, 970 Phil. 65 (2025) [per SAJ Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, En Banc].